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Abstract 
 
Our objective is to examine whether a rating change or Credit Watch announcement has a significant impact on 
Latin American stock prices. We conducted an event study to analyze stock market reaction to such news in the 
four major Latin American economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. We find similar results to those 
previously observed in the literature, wherein the impact is quite significant for  rating downgrades but less 
relevant for rating upgrades and Credit Watches. We also run cross section regressions to investigate which 
variables best explain the impact rating changes announcements have on stock prices in these countries. The 
results  indicate  that  the  most  significant  variable  is  the  absolute  change  in  the  number  of  notches  for 
downgrades. We conclude that credit ratings are relevant information in Latin America. 
 
Key words: rating change announcement; Credit Watch; event study. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Several investors and financial institutions rely on credit ratings because they summarize the 
creditworthiness of an issuer or issue in a single grade. The main rating agencies are Moody’s, Fitch 
and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). 
The agencies issue a credit opinion based on analysis of financial and qualitative aspects of the 
issuer or issue. This grade reflects a default probability. AAA to BBB- for S&P and Fitch and Aaa to 
Baa3 for Moody’s, ordered from best to worst credit quality, are considered investment grades and 
reflect a very low or almost nonexistent default probability. BB+ to CC for S&P and Fitch and Ba1 to 
Ca1 for Moody’s are considered speculative grades and reflect a higher default probability. There are 
also grades for selective default (SD) and default (D). 
The agencies disclose rating changes (upgrades and downgrades) of an issuer or issue. They 
also announce Credit Watch (S&P), Rating Watch (Fitch) or Watch List (Moody’s). According to 
Standard and Poor’s (2009), a Credit Watch means that a rating has been placed under review until 
further data about the event causing the change in credit perception have been obtained, without 
necessarily changing the rating after obtaining the missing information. S&P uses Credit Watch when 
it believes that a credit opinion is likely to be issued within 90 days. 
Agencies apply through-the-cycle methodology in rating assignments, and many times they are 
criticized for delaying rating downgrades or upgrades in relation to financial markets. But according to 
Altman and Rijken (2006), investors and regulators desire some level of stability, and do not want 
rating changes to reflect small changes in financial conditions. Therefore agencies filter out temporary 
credit risk components. This way rating changes reflect only long-term structural components, and 
agencies avoid excessive rating reversals, bearing the cost of some delay in relation to the financial 
market  pricing  of  securities.  Altman  and  Rijken  (2006)  also  point  out  that  agencies  monitor  the 
permanent credit risk component for substantial changes. A rating change, on average, only partially 
adjusts to the perceived level of a long-term credit risk component. The authors called this policy 
prudent migration, but emphasized that it is not officially disclosed by the agencies. 
Regarding rating and capital market development in Latin American, Figure 1 and Figure 2 
reflect the evolution of investors’ interests in the region. Figure 1 shows a significant increase in 
market capitalization since 2004 in the four countries we analyze. 
 
 
Figure  1.  Evolution  of  Market  Capitalization  in  the  Main  Latin  American  Markets  in  USD 
($ Billions). 
Source:  World  Federation  of  Exchanges.  (2010).  Domestic  market  capitalization (in  USD  millions).  Retrieved  from 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/statistics/excel/Ts2%20Market%20cap..XLS 
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Rating agencies’ coverage of Latin America has also increased significantly since 2004, as we 
can observe in Figure 2. Latin American companies’ credit quality has improved considerably. In July 
2010, 40% of Moody’s ratings in Latin America consisted of investment-grade companies, whereas in 
December 1999, this percentage was only 19% (Moody’s, 2010). 
Despite rating agencies’ growing interest in Latin America, the region still displays significant 
vulnerabilities. For example, Argentina went into default in 2001 and still has a limited bond-issuing 
market in terms of volume and duration when compared to the Chilean market. Argentina is the only 
country analyzed in this study to receive a speculative grade at the time of this research.  
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of Moody’s Coverage in Latin America (July-1990/2010). 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service. (2010). Special comment: Latin american corporate default and recovery rates 1990-H1 
2010.  Retrieved  from  http://www.alacrastore.com/research/moodys-global-credit-research-
Latin_American_Corporate_Default_and_Recovery_Rates_1990_H1_2010_excel_data-PBC_127420 
We decided to focus on the four major economies in Latin America instead of a single one. 
Many international investors, for instance pension funds and mutual funds, consider Latin America in 
their portfolio as a whole instead of a single country. By consolidating the four countries we examined 
a larger number of observations. It is also possible to analyze each country individually and compare 
similarities and differences in the way each one reacts to rating change announcements. 
Some authors (Vassalou & Xing, 2004) indicate that the cost of debt may increase due to rating 
downgrades. Minardi, Sanvicente and Artes (2007) develop a model for relating cost of debt to credit 
rating. The increased cost of this debt could influence stock prices (Jorion & Zhang, 2007). However, 
as agencies are criticized for delaying credit rating changes in relation to financial markets, there is a 
question whether agency information is relevant to the market. 
We intend to investigate whether the information provided by rating changes or Credit Watch 
announcements  in  Brazil,  Mexico,  Chile  and  Argentina  impact  investors’  expectations  and  thus 
contribute to stock price appreciation or depreciation. According to Ee (2008), there are at least three 
reasons why equity reactions to credit rating change announcements in Latin America can differ to 
reactions in other regions. Corporate Governance (1) and regulatory issues (2) may differ from region 
to region and from country to country. Credit ratings are based on public and private information, and 
it is not clear if rating agencies can be as effective at collecting private information in Latin American 
countries as they are in developed countries (3).   
Ee (2008) investigates how the equity markets of non-U.S. companies react to rating change 
announcements. Differently from his paper, we focus only on Latin American countries. We also 
enlarge the number of observations for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, since we include data 
from 2008 and 2009, and we conduct significance testing for individual and consolidated countries.  
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Second section presents a literature review. 
Third section discusses the methodology and database. Fourth section discusses our findings. Finally, 
the fifth section concludes the work. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
Several articles analyze credit-rating information in Latin America. Cisneros, Lizarzaburu and 
Salguero (2012) point out that the improvements in the regulatory environment in Peru, Chile and 
Colombia increase the quality and importance of rating agencies’ credit risk reports. Minardi (2008) 
estimates  Brazilian  companies’  default  probabilities  using  the  Black&Scholes  –  Merton  Model, 
compares them with Moody’s mortality rates, and associates them with a credit rating. In most cases, 
S&P’s and Moody’s credit ratings and ratings as estimated by stock prices coincide in terms of the 
rating’s capital letter. The author interprets this as evidence that credit rating information is efficient in 
Brazil. Damasceno, Artes and Minardi (2008) do not reject the hypothesis that credit ratings are stable 
in Brazil and develop a credit-rating model based on financial ratios that predict 64%  of S&P’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch’s credit ratings in Brazil.  
Bone and Ribeiro (2009) examine the impact of rating changes in the Brazilian stock market 
during  the  period  from  1995  to  2007.  They  investigate  if  rating  change  announcements  impact 
systematic risk measured by beta. They use the Chow stability test and find no evidence of structural 
breaks before or after the change. 
The  international  literature  investigates  how  credit  rating  changes  impact  publicly  traded 
companies’ share prices. Most authors find evidences that rating downgrades generate a significantly 
larger impact than rating upgrades (Dichev & Piotroski, 2001; Goh & Ederington, 1999). 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) examine stock price changes in two periods: during the month of 
a  rating  change  announcement  and  during  the  previous  eleven  months.  The  results  indicate  that 
downgrades convey information to shareholders, whereas upgrades result in minor price adjustments 
in the month of the rating adjustment. They observe that, in the case of upgrades, there is a positive 
abnormal return in the eleven months preceding the adjustment. 
Jorion  and  Zhang  (2007)  study  the  effects  of  rating  changes  (1,195  downgrades  and  361 
upgrades) in senior unsecured debt in the U.S. corporate bonds market from January 1996 to May 
2002. They find that the impact of downgrades tends to be larger than the impact of upgrades. One 
possible  reason  is  that  companies  postpone  the  disclosure  of  negative  information,  but  they 
immediately disclose positive information that may eventually result in a rating upgrade. They also 
point out that downgrades in speculative grade bonds significantly increase default probability and 
cost  of  capital,  while  downgrades  in  investment  grade  bonds  create  small  fluctuations  in  default 
probability and cost of capital. Therefore downgrades in speculative issues more heavily impact price 
changes than downgrades in investment grade issues.  
Table  1  shows  the  cumulative  default  rates  in  Latin  America  by  Moody’s  rating  category 
(Moody’s, 2010). In line with the global pattern, Latin American companies rated Ba or less (i.e., 
speculative grade) tend to have very significant variations in default rates. 
Jorion and Zhang (2007) analyze the effect of rating changes on stock returns by measuring the 
CAR (cumulative abnormal return). They examine a window from one year before until one year after 
(-1 year, +1 year) the announcing date, where (0) is the effective date of the announcement. The 
sample of downgraded companies has an average CAR of -4.43%, which is statistically significant. 
For upgraded companies, the price change comes very close to zero (CAR=0.31%). However, they 
find a positive and significant average CAR for upgrades of speculative grade issues, although of a 
smaller magnitude than the downgrade impact. A. de P. N. Freitas, A. M. A. F. Minardi   444 
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Dichev and Piotroski (2001) analyze 4,700 changes in bond ratings by Moody’s between 1970 
and 1997. They find negative abnormal returns of between 10% and 14% in the first year after the 
announcement of downgrades, whereas for upgrades this abnormal return is less significant. Similar to 
Jorion  and  Zhang  (2007),  they  observe  that  abnormal  returns  magnitudes  are  even  higher  for 
companies with low credit quality. 
 
Table 1  
 
Cumulative Default Rates between 1990 and July 2010: Latin America  
 
  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
Aaa  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Aa  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
A  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Baa  0.41%  1.12%  2.00%  3.01%  4.26% 
Ba  0.27%  1.37%  4.04%  8.61%  12.04% 
B  3.69%  9.55%  14.74%  18.17%  21.66% 
Caa-C  25.95%  36.28%  43.46%  54.28%  66.33% 
Note. Source: Moody’s Investors Service. (2010). Special comment: Latin American corporate default and recovery rates 
1990-H1  2010.  Retrieved  from  http://www.alacrastore.com/research/moodys-global-credit-research-
Latin_American_Corporate_Default_and_Recovery_Rates_1990_H1_2010_excel_data-PBC_127420  
Choy, Gray and Ragunathan (2006) study the impact of Moody’s and S&P ratings revisions of 
63 companies on the Australian stock market between 1989 and 2003. Their results show a significant 
and negative impact for downgrades, and an insignificant impact for upgrades. According to them, 
companies  very  quickly  disclose  positive  information,  and  stock  prices  immediately  reflect  such 
information, anticipating rating changes. The authors stressed, however, that their sample of upgrades 
is rather small, which may have impacted the results. 
Ee  (2008)  studies  the  abnormal  returns  of  Credit  Watch  and  rating  change  announcements 
among companies outside of the United States. In a window between (-1 year, +1 year), the author 
finds significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for rating downgrades (CAR of -1.33%) and 
negative Credit Watch announcements (CAR of -1.37%). For upgrades and positive Credit Watch 
announcements,  the  CAR  is  not  significant,  at  0.07%  and  0.13%,  respectively.  As  far  as  we  are 
concerned, this article is the only one to mention the four countries we analyze: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico. Table 2 presents Ee’s (2008) results for these four countries.  
 
Table 2  
 
Compilation of Ee’s (2008) Results for Countries Considered in our Study  
 
Country 
CAR  
related to positive 
Credit Watch 
CAR  
related to negative 
Credit Watch 
CAR  
related to long-term 
upgrades 
CAR  
related to long-term 
downgrades 
Argentina  -0.30%  -1.28%  0.05%  -2.87% 
Brazil  0.01%  0.77%  -1.28%  -0.16% 
Chile  n/a  -0.15%  -0.53%  -1.00% 
Mexico  -0.43%  -2.30%  0.05%  -1.48% 
Note. Source: Adapted from Ee, B. C. B. (2008). The impact of credit watch and bond rating changes on abnormal stock 
returns for Non-USA domiciled corporations (Master Thesis). Singapore Management University, Singapore. Retrieved from 
http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/44  The Impact of Credit Rating Changes  445 
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Overall, Ee (2008) finds negative returns for downgrades for the four countries, as expected. For 
positive and negative Credit Watches and upgrades, the signs of the CAR results did not show a 
pattern. He does not report t-tests for mean significance. 
Linciano  (2004)  studies  299  rating  actions  of  Italian  companies  by  the  three  main  rating 
agencies between January 1991 and August 2003. Unlike other authors, Linciano finds weak, negative 
abnormal  returns  for  downgrades  in  the  window  between  one  day  before  and  one  day  after  the 
announcement. For upgrades, the results indicate significant positive abnormal returns after the change 
announcement. 
Goh and Ederington (1999) find evidences that the market reacts much more negatively to 
downgrades  to  and  within  the  speculative-grade  category  than  it  does  to  downgrades  within  the 
investment-grade category. The authors find no significant market reaction to upgrades. 
Holthausen  and  Leftwich  (1986)  conducted  studies  of  contaminated  and  uncontaminated 
samples. The latter sample involved the appearance during the event window of some information in 
addition to that published in the Wall Street Journal by the rating agency. The authors found that, for 
the contaminated samples, investors received new information from downgrades, and one of the most 
significant control variables was the change in rating level. For upgrades, the explanatory power of the 
regressions was low. 
Ee (2008) finds that, for downgrades, the impact of CAR is even more negative for developed 
countries and for those downgrades crossing the border from investment grade to speculative grade. 
The author uses market capitalization as a proxy for size and, although it is significant, the coefficient 
is too small to have an impact on CAR. The reaction to negative Credit Watch announcements is 
negative and significant for firms located in developed countries. 
 
 
Methodology and Data 
 
 
We conduct an event study to investigate how rating changes and Credit Watch announcement 
impact Latin American companies’ stock prices. We also run ordinary least square regressions to 
investigate what characteristics of rating changes explain the CAR, following the same reasoning used 
by  Holthausen  and  Leftwich  (1986).  We  investigate  if  downgrades  from  investment  grade  to 
speculative grade, upgrades form speculative grade to investment grade, and the number or rating 
notches in the upgrade or downgrade influence the magnitude of the CAR.  
 
Measurement of abnormal returns  
 
Camargos and Barbosa (2003) report three statistical models for determining abnormal returns: 
(a)  constant  mean-adjusted  returns,  (b)  market-adjusted  returns  and  (c)  risk-  and  market-adjusted 
returns (market model). 
We use, as suggested by Ee (2008), the market-adjusted return model. This model compares the 
returns of stock prices to the return of a benchmark, which is usually a stock index. This model 
assumes that asset returns are “simultaneously, normal, multivariate distributed independently and 
identically in time” (Camargos & Barbosa, 2003, p. 8).  
The market adjusted return model is a simplification of the market model. It assumes that alpha 
is zero and beta is one. It is not a strong assumption in our sample, since we estimate a mean beta of 
0.92 and a median of 0.95. Both mean and median for alpha is zero. This simplified model avoids 
estimation errors in calculating alphas and betas parameters. It also allows us to use more observations 
in computing abnormal returns. In order to estimate alphas and betas we need to have a reasonable A. de P. N. Freitas, A. M. A. F. Minardi   446 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 10, n. 4, art. 4, pp. 439-461, Oct./Dec. 2013                 www.anpad.org.br/bar   
number of days in which shares are traded in the estimation window. In a timeline, the estimation 
window comes before the event-window.  
The market-adjusted return model is widely used in event studies and, according to Brown and 
Warner (1980) and Kloeckner (1995), gives a result that is quite similar to that of other models.  
We calculate abnormal returns relative to specific benchmarks for each country in our sample. 
We use the IPSA for Chile; the IPC for Mexico; the Merval for Argentina; and, finally, the BOVESPA 
for Brazil.  
 
Definition of the event window  
 
We use an event window equal to fourteen days before (-14) and thirty days after (+30) the date 
of a rating change announcement (0). 
According to Camargos and Barbosa (2003, p. 3), the choice of the window is arbitrary and 
“should not be too long, because it would risk encompassing other events, generating biases, nor too 
small, because it would risk failing to fully capture the abnormality in prices”. The literature about 
market reaction to rating announcement does not have a consensus in the event window definition. 
Dichev  and  Piotroski  (2001)  check  different  event  windows:  0  (date  of  the  announcement)  to  3 
months, to 6 months, to 1 year, to 2 years and to 3 years after the announcement. Jorion and Zhang 
(2007) checked the event window of 1 year before to 1 year after the announcement. Ee (2008) tested 
different windows: 1 day before to 1 day after, 3 days before to 3 days after, 50 days before to 26 days 
before, 25 days before to one day before.  
Some studies indicate that investors may anticipate (including insider trading in Ee (2008) or 
react to (Vassalou & Xing, 2004) the rating change. We choose to analyze abnormal stock returns 
from 14 days before to 30 days after the event announcement. This window is not so far from the 
event day that it can be influenced by other news, but it is long enough to allow studying if there are 
anticipations and under-reactions to the rating announcement. 
 
Data 
 
We collect stocks’ and indexes’ daily closing prices and financial information for companies 
listed in four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) between 01/01/2000 and 
12/31/2009.  
We select the sample based on the following criteria:  
.  being a publicly traded company with shares held by the major stock indexes in their respective 
countries (IPSA in Chile, IPC in Mexico, Merval in Argentina and IBOVESPA in Brazil) as of 
12/21/2010. 
.  having experienced changes in issuer ratings or foreign currency long-term ratings by any of the 
three major rating agencies between 01/01/2000 and 12/31/2009. Among the reasons we use issuer 
ratings rather than issue ratings is that issues may present some peculiarities such as guarantees or 
covenants that do not reflect the issuer credit quality as a whole. 
We collect closing prices in USD ($), adjusted for earnings, stock splits and dividends from the 
Economática®  database.  We  collect  changes  in  ratings  and  Credit  Watch  announcements  from 
Bloomberg. 
We do not include in the sample cases classified by S&P as developing (except Klabin’s rating 
change announced on 11/19/2002, which was effectively an upgrade). The Impact of Credit Rating Changes  447 
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In the case of mergers, such as Fibria, a company resulting from the merger of Aracruz Celulose 
and Votorantim Celulose e Papel, we use the financial and price data adjusted by Economática® 
(VCPA4+FIBR3). In cases where a company listed on the stock exchange has more than one class of 
stock, we select the class with the highest average volume traded between 01/01/2000 and 12/31/2010.  
We disregard rating changes of companies whose shares were not traded on dates close to the 
announcement. In cases where multiple agencies announce a rating change or Credit Watch on the 
same day we select the one that has the greatest absolute impact in terms of notches of grades. In order 
to promote data independency, we only consider the difference between the date of the last day of a 
first change and the date of the first day of a second change to be more than 74 calendar days. Our 
final sample contains 319 changes across the four countries. 
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the distribution of downgrades, upgrades, negative Credit Watch and 
positive  Credit  Watch.  Regarding  the  number  of  downgrades  shown  in  Figure  3,  there  is  a 
concentration during 2001, the year of the major downturn in Argentina’s economy. Around 35-50% 
of downgrades in Argentina and Brazil that were observed in our sample occurred in 2001. Brazil, by 
that time, was a non-investment grade country and Brazilian companies might have been impacted 
because of its economic links to Argentina. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Downgrades – Sample of 72. 
Source: authors’ analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Upgrades – Sample of 149. 
Source: authors’ analysis. 
Figures 4 and 6 shows a more disperse distribution of upgrades and positive  Credit Watch 
compared to downgrades, showing some concentration in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, years that the 
regional economy was experiencing significant growth. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Negative Credit Watch - Sample of 49. 
Source: authors’ analysis. 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Positive Credit Watch. 
Source: authors’ analysis. 
In line with downgrades, negative Credit Watch announcements show a concentration during 
years of crisis: 2001, the debt crisis in Argentina, and 2008-2009, the sub-prime crisis.  
Of the original ratings, almost 2/3 of the sample is speculative grades: 5.2% are A, 30.3% are 
BBB, 33.1% are BB, 27.5% are B and 4% are CCC-C. Only Chile and Mexico have companies with 
original ratings in the A category. Figure 7 contains a summary of the upgrades and downgrades in 
Latin America. We can observe that for each original rating, the majority of the migration is for 1 
notch down, followed by 1 notch up. This is in accordance with the prudent migration discussed by 
Altman and Rijkent (2006), that agencies tend to make minor changes in rating grades. 
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Figure 7. Rating Upgrades and Downgrades in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, 2000-2009. 
Source: authors’ analysis. 
 
Procedures for calculating abnormal returns  
 
We  adopt  the  methodology  proposed  by  Campbell,  Lo  and  Mackinlay  (1997)  to  estimate 
abnormal  returns.  We  calculate the  return  on each asset i  by  equation  1,  where ln is the natural 
logarithm, Pi,t is the price of asset i on day t and Pi,t-1 is the price of asset i on day t-1.   
) / ln( 1 , , ,   t i t i t i P P R   (1) 
We calculate abnormal returns by equation (2), where Ri,t and Rindex,t are the returns of asset i on 
date t and the return of the country index where the asset is found on date t, respectively. 
t index t i t i R R AR , , ,     (2) 
We use equation (3) to estimate the cumulative abnormal return. 



T
t
t i T i AR CAR
0
, ,  
(3) 
We estimate the average CAR of sample s according to equation (4), where N is the number of 
events (or changes). In this paper, when we mention CAR results, we are referring to the  sample 
average CAR. 
N
CAR
CAR
n
i
T i
T i

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1
,
,  
(4) 
We define the null and alternative hypotheses to determine whether the calculated CAR is 
significant as follows: 
.  H0: No abnormal return is observed in Latin American companies’ stock prices in certain event 
windows after the announcement of a change in rating or Credit Watch.  
.  HA: An abnormal return is observed in Latin American companies’ stock prices in certain event 
windows after the announcement of a change in rating or Credit Watch. 
We find that CAR variance is: 
T CAR T  
2 ˆ ) var(    (5) 
Initial Final Rating
Rating A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC D
A+ 100.0%
A 100.0%
A- 16.7% 83.3%
BBB+ 7.1% 92.9%
BBB 3.8% 15.4% 80.8%
BBB- 19.4% 77.8% 2.8%
BB+ 8.0% 80.0% 8.0% 4.0%
BB 3.6% 14.3% 75.0% 7.1%
BB- 3.3% 23.3% 73.3%
B+ 2.8% 50.0% 47.2% 0.0%
B 11.8% 47.1% 41.2%
B- 37.5% 50.0% 12.5%
CCC 20.0% 20.0% 50.0% 10.0%A. de P. N. Freitas, A. M. A. F. Minardi   450 
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where  ˆ sTis the standard deviation of a sample’s mean abnormal return, and T is the number of days 
used for computing CAR  .    
The t-statistic test is calculated by equation (6).  
) var(
,
CAR
CAR
stat t
T i
   
(6) 
According  to  Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) ,  we should use this type of test  for 
investigating if a given event has any significant impact on the returns in the analyzed window.   
We perform all of the calculations based on the following subgroups:  
1.  downgrade  (all  rating  changes  resulting  in  one  notch  or  more  downgrades,  including  when 
accompanied by changes in Credit Watch),  
2.  upgrade  (all  upward  rating  changes  involving  an  elevation  of  a  rating  by  one  notch  or  more, 
including when accompanied by changes in Credit Watch),  
3.  negative Credit Watch (all downward changes by only one level due to a changing Credit Watch 
rating, without a notch change),  
4.  positive Credit Watch (all upward changes by only one level due to a changing Credit Watch 
rating, without a notch change),  
5.  changes from speculative to investment grade,  
6.  changes from investment to speculative grade,  
7.  individual analyses by country.  
 
Analysis of significant CAR determinants  
 
To determine which variables significantly determine CAR, we run White’s heteroscedasticity 
robust multivariate regressions with qualitative and quantitative variables. The dependent variable is 
the CAR measured from 14 days before to thirty days after the event. 
The  financial  and  qualitative  data  used relate  to the  rating  change  date (0),  and,  whenever 
unavailable, we used the latest data. 
We investigate the following variables:  
1.  size (represented by the logarithm of the market value in millions of US$ or the logarithm of 
revenues in millions of US$); 
2.  dummies identifying countries, with zero representing Brazil and each dummy indicating one to the 
other three countries;  
3.  dummies identifying changes crossing the investment-grade border;  
4.  leverage ratios (represented by Liabilities/Total Assets or Net Debt/EBITDA); and  
5.  a downgrade dummy interacting with the magnitude of the rating change.  
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CAR i,30 =b0 +b1*LEVERAGE+b2 *LOG(SIZE)+b3DOWNGRADE*VRATING+
b4 *(1-DOWNGRADE)*VRATING+b5 *DARG+b6 *DMEX+
b7 *DCL +b8 *DSPIG+b9 *DIGSP +ei
 
(7) 
where: 
.  30 , i CAR : cumulative abnormal return from 14 days before until 30 days after each change i;  
.  0  : regression intercept; 
.  LEVERAGE: We expect a negative coefficient because the higher the leverage, the greater the risk 
of default and the more negative the impact should be on CAR. We use two different financial 
ratios to measure financial leverage.  
.  LIABILITIES/A: total liabilities to total asset ratios. 
.  D/EBITDA: net debt to EBITDA  
.  LOG(SIZE): The size of the company should be negatively correlated with CAR because larger 
companies are more visible and should be less impacted by a new classification (Elayan, Hsu, & 
Meyer, 2003). We use two measures of size: 
.  LOG(MKTCAP): logarithm of the company market value.  
.  LOG(REVENUE): logarithm of company revenues. 
.  DOWNGRADE: dummy variable assuming the value of 1 when a downgrade takes place. When the 
change is a Credit Watch announcement or upgrade, this variable assumes the value of zero. The 
expected sign for the coefficient is negative because the expected CAR is negative in a downgrade.  
.  VRATING: absolute change of ratings, calculated as the cardinal difference between the previous 
and the new ratings. This variable assumes the value of zero when there is only a Credit Watch 
change or when the change occurs within the subgroup of ratings indicating that a company is very 
close to default or has already defaulted.  
.  DARG: dummy variable assuming the value of 1 when the change applies to Argentina. 
.  DMEX: dummy variable assuming the value of 1 when the change applies to Mexico. 
.  DCL: dummy variable assuming the value of 1 when the change applies to Chile. 
.  DSPIG: dummy variable assuming the value of 1 when the grade improves from speculative to 
investment grade. The coefficient of this variable should be positive because investors tend to 
purchase assets with lower credit risk.  
.  DIGSP: dummy variable assuming the value of 1 when the grading declines from investment to 
speculative grade. The coefficient of this variable should be negative because investors tend to 
divest assets that are considered speculative.  
The last two dummies of the equation (DSPIG and DIGSP) and the variable VRATING follow 
the same reasoning used by Jorion and Zhang (2007). The authors create a dummy that assumes a 
value of 1 when a rating change crosses the investment-speculative-grade border and 0 otherwise. 
In addition, they use a variable measuring the magnitude of a rating change on a cardinal scale. 
For upgrades, the sign of this variable should be positive, indicating a positive effect on the return. The 
reverse  should  happen  for  downgrades.  This  paper  uses  the  interaction  between  the  dummy  that A. de P. N. Freitas, A. M. A. F. Minardi   452 
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identifies whether the change was a downgrade and the VRATING variable. For downgrades, the 
CAR is negative because the variable that reflects the change in ratings (VRATING) is negative and 
the dummy of downgrades is necessarily equal to one. Thus, for downgrades, the more negative the 
interaction between the two variables is, given that the coefficient is positive, the more negative CAR 
should become. 
To transform the extent of a rating change into a quantitative variable, like Jorion and Zhang 
(2007) and Damasceno, Artes and Minardi (2008), we transform the credit rating into a cardinal scale, 
beginning with AAA as 1, AA+ as 2, and so on. S&P has ratings ranging from AAA to D, whereas 
Moody’s uses a scale ranging from Aaa to C. Table 3 displays the ratings by agency, interpretation 
and numerical scale. 
 
Table 3  
 
Ratings by Agency, Interpretation and Numerical Scale  
 
 
Note. Source: Adapted from Damasceno, D. L., Artes, R., & Minardi, A. M. A. F. (2008). Determinação de rating de crédito 
de empresas brasileiras com a utilização de índices contábeis. Revista de Administração da Universidade de São Paulo, 
43(4), 344-355.  
 
 
Results 
 
 
Our  sample  consists  of  319  rating  changes  or  Credit  Watch  announcements,  with  39  in 
Argentina, 138 in Brazil, 55 in Chile and 87 in Mexico. Brazil and Mexico are the two largest capital 
markets,  have  the  majority  of  companies  covered  by  rating  agencies  and  a  higher  number  of 
observations in our sample.  
 
Average CAR  
 
Figure  8  shows  the  average  CAR  behavior  for  upgrades  and  downgrades  across  the  time 
window analyzed. We can observe that the market anticipates downgrades and continues to react after 
the announcement. This evidence is consistent with Goh and Ederington (1999). 
In the case of downgrades, CAR starts to be significant at the 10% level 9 days before the event, 
at the 5% level 4 days before and at the 1% level 1 day before announcement. This fact is in line with 
the arguments of Servigny and Renault (2004) and Altman and Rijken (2006). According to these 
S&P Fitch Moody's Interpretation Numeric Scale S&P Fitch Moody's Interpretation Numeric Scale
BB+ BB+ Ba1 11
AAA AAA Aaa 1 BB BB Ba2 12
BB- BB- Ba3 13
AA+ AA+ Aa1 2 B+ B+ B1 14
AA AA Aa2 3 B B B2 15
AA- AA- Aa3 4 B- B- B3 16
A+ A+ A1 5 CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 17
A A A2 6 CCC CCC Caa2 18
A- A- A3 7 CCC- CCC- Caa3 19
CC CC Ca 20
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 8
BBB BBB Baa2 9 C C C 22
BBB- BBB- Baa3 10 SD DDD - 22
D DD 22
- D 22
Medium-high 
grade,
with low credit 
risk 
Bad credit conditions and 
it is subject to high credit 
risk
Moderate Credit 
Risk
Very close
to default
or in default 
Investment Grade Speculative Grade
Very high credit 
quality
It has speculative 
elements
and it is subject to 
substantial credit risk 
High credit quality
It is considered 
speculative
  and it has high
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authors, rating agencies adopt a conservative approach by granting through-the-cycle rating grades. 
Therefore rating changes may capture credit quality deterioration with a certain time lag. 
Many institutional investors have a policy of only keeping investment-grade bonds in their 
portfolios. One possible reason why the CAR continues to be very significant after the downgrade 
announcement  is  the  existence  of  downgrades  crossing  the  investment-grade  to  speculative-grade 
border.  However,  when  we  exclude  the  four  changes  from  investment  to  speculative  grade,  the 
magnitude of CAR decreases, but it remains very significant at the 1% level after 30 days (CAR=-
7.2%, t-stat=-7.5). We interpret this finding as evidence of under-reaction to rating downgrade news. 
One possible explanation is that some investors, pension funds for instance, also have committees to 
decide whether to increase or decrease the allocation in a certain security, and this may create a time 
lag between downgrades announcements and portfolio rebalancing. 
For upgrades, the average CAR remains around 0% without showing a clear pattern for up to 21 
days after the upgrade, when it starts to present a positive average CAR, but remains very close to zero 
and without significance.  
According  to  Ederington  and  Goh  (1998),  the  different  market  reactions  to  upgrades  and 
downgrades  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  positive  news  are  disseminated  more  quickly  than 
negative news and, therefore, the impact  of positive news on stocks is absorbed sooner. Another 
possible explanation raised by the authors is that rating agencies invest more resources in the search 
for  causes  of  deterioration  in  companies’  financial  situations  than  they  do  for  causes  of  credit 
enhancements. When a rating agency puts more effort into finding evidence of companies’ worsening 
abilities to pay, one expects to find evidence that the market has not yet observed, which would 
explain why agencies bring new information for downgrades. 
Table 4 summarizes the average CAR results for downgrades and upgrades, respectively, by 
country and consolidated, with their respective t-statistics, between 14 days before the event and 30 
days after it. 
For downgrades, we observe a CAR of -7.86%, which is highly significant at the 1% level. We 
reject the null hypothesis that an abnormal return of Latin American companies’ stock prices is not 
observed for downgrades.  
For the countries studied, the reactions to the news are negative and significant at the 5% level, 
except for Argentina, which shows a non-significant negative reaction. 
For upgrades, we observe a non-significant average CAR of 0.51%, which is a smaller impact 
compared to that of downgrades. In general, there are more upgrades than downgrades in our sample, 
thus demonstrating recent improvements in the region’s credit score. Whereas Argentina shows more 
downgrades than upgrades during the analyzed period (17 downgrades and 10 upgrades), Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico combined had 55 downgrades and 139 upgrades. 
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Figure 8. Average CAR Evolution for Downgrades and Upgrades in the Sample. 
Source: authors’ analysis. 
Although  the  consolidated  results  are  similar  to  the  findings  of  previous  studies,  when  we 
analyze the CAR for each individual country, Table 4 shows different behavior for upgrades. For both 
Argentina and Chile, investors seem to be impacted by upgrade announcements because the CAR is 
positive and significant. For Brazil and Mexico, the negative CAR is counterintuitive, but both are 
close to zero and non-significant.  
 
Table 4 
 
CAR (+30) for Downgrades and Upgrades by Country and Across all 4 Countries 
 
Country  Downgrade  Obs.  Upgrade  Obs. 
Argentina  -1.22% 
(-0.31) 
17  6.32% 
(1.25*) 
10 
Brazil  -6.35% 
(-1.87**) 
24  -0.86% 
(-0.61) 
79 
Chile  -9.09% 
(-3.29***) 
14  4.87% 
(1.80**) 
19 
Mexico  -15.64% 
(-3.23***) 
17  -0.28% 
(-0.14) 
41 
Total  -7.86% 
(-4.25***) 
72  0.51% 
(0.52) 
149 
Note. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
*** refers to abnormal returns significantly different from zero at 1% significance; ** refers to abnormal returns significantly 
different from zero at 5% significance; * refers to abnormal returns significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
With respect to changes in Credit Watch (positive and negative), Figure 9 shows the average 
CAR evolution for the whole sample, and Table 5 summarizes the results by country and consolidated, 
with their respective t-statistics. 
Even if a Credit Watch announcement is a short- or medium-term indication of possible rating 
changes,  the  consolidated results  in  our  sample  do not  show a  clear  trend  of  behavior for either 
positive  or  negative  Credit  Watch  (Figure  9)  and  indicate  that  investors’  information  is  still 
insufficient to significantly impact the CAR within 30 days after the event. 
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For negative Credit Watch announcements, the results are generally different from those found 
by Ee (2008), where the observed CAR is significant, though less significant for developing countries 
compared to developed countries. 
For the 30 days after the change, the signs are as expected and in line with the results presented 
by Ee (2008), though both results are non-significant. In our sample, in the case of negative Credit 
Watch announcements, the CAR has a negative sign during the period (CAR average of -0.26%); for 
positive Credit Watch announcements, the sign of the CAR is positive (average CAR of 0.41%). 
When the analysis is done by country, the effect of a negative Credit Watch announcement is 
not significant for any country in the window between (-14, +30). 
 
 
Figure 9. Average CAR Evolution for Negative and Positive Credit Watch Announcements in the 
Sample. 
Source: authors’ analysis. 
Table  5  shows  that,  for  positive  Credit  Watch  announcements,  the  average  CAR  is  not 
significant for any of the four countries. Despite the small sample size, for Argentina the positive 
Credit Watch announcements unexpectedly resulted in a CAR of -5.71%. We do not report the t-
statistic for positive Credit Watch announcements in Argentina due to the low number of observations.  
Table 6 shows the consolidated results of CAR for changes that crossed the investment-grade 
barrier. Despite the small sample size, of the 28 observations of changes from investment grade to 
speculative grade, the average CAR is 2.7% and significant. 
This  impact  is  even  larger  in  absolute  terms  when  analyzing  changes  from  investment  to 
speculative grade. The average CAR for the four observations of such a change was -19.22%, but due 
to the small number of observations, no significance test was performed. This reaction shows the 
effect of an investment-grade rating, as described by Jorion and Zhang (2007), wherein investors tend 
to  divest  stocks  of  speculative-grade  companies  and  buy  stocks  of  investment-grade  companies. 
Pension funds and institutional investors often have a policy of investing only in investment grade 
securities. Therefore, when a company is downgraded to speculative grade, investors are forced to sell 
issues of this issuer for not fitting into internal investment policies. This explanation would account for 
the trend of negative reactions of the CAR to downgrades and positive reactions to upgrades.  
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Table 5 
 
CAR (+30) for Negative (-1) and Positive (+1) Credit Watch Announcements by Country and for 
the Sample as a Whole  
 
Country  Negative Credit 
Watch 
Obs.  Positive Credit 
Watch 
Obs. 
Argentina  -2.53% 
(-0.42) 
7  -5.71% 
N/A 
5 
Brazil  0.19% 
(0.04) 
14  1.95% 
(0.30) 
21 
Chile  -1.26% 
(-0.27) 
12  0.33% 
(0.11) 
10 
Mexico  1.08% 
(0.29) 
16  1.79% 
(0.47) 
13 
Total  -0.26% 
(-0.11) 
49  0.41% 
(0.51) 
49 
Note. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 6 
 
CAR (+30) for Changes that Cross the Investment-grade Barrier 
 
Change  CAR (-14.+30)  t-statistic  Observations 
From speculative to investment grade  2.70%  1.16*  28 
From investment to speculative grade  -19.22%  N/A  4 
Note. ** refers to abnormal returns significantly different from zero at 5% significance. 
 
Robustness checks 
 
We conduct three robustness checks: (a) we changed the length of the event window; (b) we 
excluded downgrades announced in 2001 from the sample; and (c) we estimated CAR using market 
model instead of market adjusted returns. 
We  investigate  three  different  event  windows:  (-1,  +1),  (-2,+2)  and  (-3,+3),  and  the  tests 
validate that stock markets in Latin America reacts negatively to downgrades and ignore upgrades. For 
downgrades, we find a CAR equal to -1.23% for the event window (-1, +1), equal to -1.40% for (-2, 
+2) and equal to -1.82% for (-3, +3), and all three results are significant at the 1% level. For upgrades, 
we find a CAR equal to 0.11% for the window (-1, +1), equal to 0.20% for (-2, +2) and equal to 0.36% 
for (-3, +3), and all three results are insignificant.  
We excluded 2001 events from the sample, because there was a concentration of downgrades, 
especially for Argentina and Brazil (see Figure 3), and we estimated a CAR for 30 days after the event 
of -8.7%, significant at the 1% level, confirming our previous findings.  
We also estimated CAR using the market model, calculating the abnormal return as follows. 
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For estimating the parameters alpha and beta we use an estimation window of 252 days before 
the event window. The average α was 0, with median 0 and the average β was 0.92, with median 0.95. 
Our results confirm a negative CAR for 30 days after the event equal to -4,00%, significant at the 2% 
level, starting to be negative and significant 10 days before the announcement, and with significant 
under-reaction  to  30  days  after.  We  also  find  insignificant  results  for  upgrades,  confirming  our 
findings with the market-adjust returns model.  
 
Determinants of the CAR for Latin American stocks by changes in rating 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results of four regressions with cross-sectional data investigating which 
variables (qualitative and/or quantitative) significantly explain the reaction of the stock price to the 
event of a credit rating change. 
Models 1 and 2 use the interaction of the dummy variable for downgrades and the absolute 
change in ratings as an explanatory variable. The differences between the two models lie in the use of 
different  leverage  ratios  (model  1  uses  the  Total  Liabilities/Assets  and  model  2  uses  Net 
Debt/EBITDA) and different size indicators (model 1 uses the logarithm of market value, whereas 
model 2 uses the logarithm of revenue). In both models, we find results consistent with Holthausen 
and Leftwich (1986), where the most significant variable is the interaction between the downgrade 
dummy and the change in absolute rating, which results in a highly significant positive coefficient as 
expected. In the case of downgrades, the greater the negative change of ratings is, the more negative 
the  average  CAR  tends  to  be,  possibly  because  companies  with  a  declining  ability  to  meet  their 
financial  commitments  tend  to  pay  higher  interest  rates  for  loans,  decreasing  the  cash  flow  to 
shareholders. 
For  changes  other  than  downgrades,  the  interaction  between  (1-DOWNGRADE)  and 
VRATING is non-significant. 
Note that the net debt/EBITDA ratio in model 2 is positively significant to CAR, and therefore 
the more leveraged the issuer, the stronger the market reaction to rating announcements. 
The basic difference between models 1 and 2 and models 3 and 4 lies in the latter’s use of 
dummies identifying changes that cross the investment-grade border as a result of both downgrades 
and upgrades, instead of the interaction between the dummy of downgrades and the absolute change in 
the rating. These dummies contribute the most to explaining the CAR in these models and have the 
expected  signs:  they  are  negative  when  the  change  is  from  investment  to  speculative  grade  and 
positive when the change is from speculative to investment grade. 
We observe that, for both model 3 and model 4, the dummies identifying downgrades from 
investment to speculative grade are more significant than the dummies identifying upgrades from 
speculative to investment grade. This result is consistent with the argument that the average CAR has 
a larger impact when it is a downgrade. 
In  all  models,  the  constant  is  not  significant,  nor  are  the  dummy  variables  identifying  the 
country or the variables indicating company size. 
The  second  model  demonstrates  the  greatest  explanatory  power  because  it  has  the  highest 
adjusted R
2 and lowest probability (F-statistic), indicating that the variables are jointly significant. 
Models  3  and  4  do  not  have  good  explanatory  power  because  they  have  low  adjusted  R
2  and 
probability (F-statistic) greater than 10%. 
 A. de P. N. Freitas, A. M. A. F. Minardi   458 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 10, n. 4, art. 4, pp. 439-461, Oct./Dec. 2013                 www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Table 7 
 
Sensitivity  of  CAR  in  the  Latin  American  Stock  Market  to  Qualitative  and  Quantitative 
Variables – Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables  Coefficient/t-stat  Coefficient/t-stat  Coefficient/t-stat  Coefficient/t-stat 
β0  -0.029 
(-0.277) 
0.058 
(0.526) 
-0.098 
(-0.941) 
0.029 
(0.249) 
LIABILITIES/A  -0.000 
(-0.401) 
-  -0.000 
(-0.542) 
- 
D/EBITDA  -  0.000 
(2.127)** 
-  0.001 
(3.577) 
LOG(MKTCAP)  0.002 
(0.298) 
-  0.006 
(0.968) 
- 
LOG(REVENUE)  -  -0.004 
(-0.614) 
-  -0.004 
(-0.483) 
DOWNGRADE * 
VRATING 
0.054 
(2.736)*** 
0.082 
(4.224)*** 
-  - 
(1-DOWNGRADE) * 
VRATING 
0.013 
(1.191) 
0.005 
(0.544) 
-  - 
DARG  0.039 
(1.277) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
0.029 
(0.934) 
-0.014 
(-0.435) 
DCL  0.016 
(0.712) 
0.023 
(0.979) 
0.017 
(0.758) 
0.018 
(0.714) 
DMEX  -0.006 
(-0.335) 
-0.002 
(-0.097) 
-0.006 
(-0.355) 
-0.003 
(-0.154) 
DSPIG  -  -  0.042 
(1.722)* 
0.054 
(1.879)* 
DIGSP  -  -  -0.172 
(-2.837)*** 
-0.172 
(-2.916)*** 
R
2  0.071  0.116  0.037  0.043 
Adjusted R
2  0.050  0.093  0.015  0.017 
F-statistic  3.395  4.973  1.709  1.686 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.002***  0.000***  0.106  0.113 
Sample  318  272  318  272 
Note. Variables used in the models: β0: regression constant. LIABILITIES/A: the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
D/EBITDA:  Net  Debt  to  EBITDA  ratio,  which  indicates  the number  of  periods of  operational  cash  flow  creation  of  a 
company to cover the debt position minus the cash position. LOG(MKTCAP): logarithm of market value. LOG(Revenue): 
logarithm  of  revenue.  DOWNGRADE:  dummy  variable  assuming  the  value  1  for  a  downgrade.  VRATING:  absolute 
variation of ratings, representing the cardinal difference between the previous and the new ratings. Assumes the value zero 
when there is only a Credit Watch change or when the change occurs within the subset of ratings that indicate that the 
company  is  very  near  or  already  in  default.  DARG:  dummy  variable assuming  the  value  1  when  the  change  refers to 
Argentina.  DMEX:  dummy  variable  assuming  the  value  1  when  the  change  refers  to  Mexico.  DCL:  dummy  variable 
assuming the value 1 when the change refers to Chile. DSPIG: dummy variable assuming the value 1 when the rating 
changes from speculative to investment grade. DIGSP: dummy variable assuming the value 1 when the rating changes from 
investment to speculative grade.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. *** refers to abnormal returns different from zero at 1% significance; ** refers to 
abnormal returns different from zero at 5% significance; * refers to abnormal returns different from zero at 10% significance. The Impact of Credit Rating Changes  459 
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Conclusions 
 
 
Our objective is to investigate stock market behavior in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
when a rating change or Credit Watch occurs and to identify variables that might help to explain the 
magnitude of investors’ reaction to the news. We use cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to measure 
market reaction to news. 
Consistent  with  much  of  the  international  literature,  we  find that  during  the event  window 
around the date of a downgrade, the stock prices of publicly traded companies in these countries in 
general (and also most of the specific companies) experience considerable negative returns. We can 
observe  negative  reaction  both  before  the  rating  change  date,  which  can  be  explained  by  the 
conservatism of the rating agencies (Servigny & Renault, 2004), and after the change, which can be 
explained by market under-reaction, possibly arising from a lower free cash flow to equity after a 
downgrade, which would increase the cost of funding the company and the time institutional investors 
may take to decide to divest a certain company’s stock. 
For upgrades, although the average CAR is positive, we find no evidence of a significant impact 
on stock prices. Among the possible explanations for the difference in the magnitudes of CAR for 
downgrades and upgrades is that companies disclose positive data immediately. The same does not 
occur with negative news. In addition, rating agencies may make more of an effort to find evidence, 
unobserved by the market, supporting a downgrade. Such evidence would decrease the company’s 
credit quality; thus, the downgrade provides investors with new information. 
We also note that, for positive or negative Credit Watch changes, the impact is not as significant 
as the impacts observed for downgrades; however, between (-14, +30), the sign of CAR is as expected. 
Although there is little research assessing the impact of Credit Watch announcements, particularly 
when they are positive, our results are consistent with those reported by Ee (2008). In the countries 
included in the sample, Credit Watch disclosure might be less informative because investors would 
prefer to wait for the change in rating. The rating agencies may not yet be equipped with all necessary 
information to issue a conclusive opinion when they issue the Credit Watch. 
We also find that the CAR is higher in absolute terms when there are rating changes crossing 
the investment-grade/speculative-grade border. 
With respect to the regressions, we find that the absolute change in ratings during a downgrade 
is significantly related to CAR. 
Sample size is a limitation, especially because there are very few data for downgrades and 
upgrades  crossing  the  investment  grade  to  speculative  grade  border.  Although  using  CAR  as  a 
dependent variable in cross section regression is  usual in the literature, the result may be biased, 
because CAR is measured with errors. According to Cochrane (2005), the method of least squares 
corrected  by  White  heterocedasticity  robust  approach  may  yield  consistent  estimates  but  is  not 
efficient if the errors are not independent and identically distributed. Our results show evidences that, 
like other countries, credit ratings are relevant information in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, 
especially in rating downgrades. It contributes to a better understanding of investors’ behavior. Many 
institutional  investors  divest  securities  of  companies  that  are  downgraded  by  rating  agencies. 
Moreover, because the development of the Latin American capital markets and the increased coverage 
by rating agencies are relatively recent, the present study is one of the few to provide more data on the 
impact of ratings in these four countries. The issue concerning the relevance of credit rating is crucial, 
because the Bale Agreement suggests agency credit ratings as one of the inputs in the internal models 
for assessing financial institution credit risk. 
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